Ecuadorian Foreign Policy 2008

Ecuadorian foreign policy is caught in a puzzling Catch 22. According to the Constitution of 1998, "The Foreign Service is in charge of conducting the international affairs of the Republic, pursuant to the Political Constitution of the State…"[1] but, as of September 30, 2007 this constitution was dissolved by a plenipotentiary Constitutional Assembly convoked to draft a new national charter.

In the mean time the system is run by a popular president and an Assembly dominated by the president's party Acuerdo Pais (AP). This situation makes some aspects of policy analysis difficult, but not impossible. While the institutional structure is not yet codified, it operates on the basic system established under the 1998 Constitution. Accordingly we will focus on those aspects of its policy that have influenced its behavior in the past and continue to generate pressure today.

What is Ecuador's current foreign policy?

In this section we will rely on the Foreign Ministry's 15 year policy plan known as Planex 2020. [2] Written on the eve of national elections in 2006, the plan is introspective and questions how Ecuador's foreign policy can best help the nation develop. Designed to "protect as much as possible the foreign actions of the State from the ups and downs of party policy, and to develop a coherent and lasting State policy, one of whose effects would be consolidating the credibility of Ecuador at international level." [3]

Given this focus, it is a good indicator of Ecuador's long term national interests without the political ideology that accompanies each presidential administration. While the document is currently official policy, like the rest of the national agenda, whether or not it will remain so is uncertain until the new Constitution is ratified. In the meantime the president of the republic and Mesa 9 of the Constitutional Assembly are the de facto authorities in foreign affairs.

As discussed earlier, Ecuador's historic foreign policy focused on several basic principles; non-intervention, national sovereignty, insistence on the rule of law and the rejection of the threat of force in international affairs. The 2006 plan adds the protection of emigrants, human rights, economic relations, security, culture, cooperation for development, and multilateral bodies. The current president has embraced some of these principles and diverged from others in his direction of the country since 2007.

In terms of non-intervention and national sovereignty the president has chosen to take a hard line against the United States, threatening to suspend the use of the dollar as the national currency, cancelling the bilateral FTA negotiations with the US and promising not to renew the contract for the US military base in Manta when it expires in 2009. [4]

While these actions are in line with policy goals of achieving national sovereignty and limiting foreign intervention, the method of execution has placed the president at odds with the economic goal of "consolidating the credibility of Ecuador at international level." The president has used the same anti-US techniques practiced by earlier 'populist' presidents to generate popular support for his policies, demonizing the US as an "imperial power" and accusing the US government of interference in internal politics. [5]

According to Oswaldo Hurtado, former president of Ecuador between 1981 and 1986, this attitude costs Ecuador credibility as a 'serious' member of the international community. [6]

In terms on the insistence on the rule of international law and the rejection of the threat of force in international affairs, the conflict with Colombia that broke out in March 2008 is illustrative of President Correa's stance on both issues.

He first used the threat of force by mobilizing Ecuador's military to the border area while simultaneously calling for a special meeting of the OAS. The show of force served to increase pressure and the forum of OAS was used to force Colombia to comply with its international obligations to respect Ecuador's borders. The strategy is essentially realist because of the implicit acceptance of force as a legitimate tool of international relations.

By Nathan Gill - Southern Affairs
http://www.southernaffairs.org/

[1] Article 1, Ecuadorian National Constitution 1998 [2] Ecuadorian Ministry of Foreign Relations. Planex2020: National Foreign Policy Plan 2006 – 2020. Quito Oct 2006 [3] Planex 2020 [4] When asked by TeleSur, the Venezuelan TV channel run by the president of Mesa 9, Maria Augusta Calle, if the US was trying to block his election in Dec 2006 he said, [El Gobierno estadounidense sabe] "que nosotros no vamos a ser empleados de nadie (…) que vamos a hacer respetar la soberanía y al país y hemos dicho cosas muy concretas: que no vamos a formar el Tratado de Libre Comercio, que no permitiremos que al país se le involucre al plan Colombia y cuando culmine el convenio de la base militar norteamericana en la ciudad Manta en 2009 no se renovarán dichos convenios" TeleSur. "Rafael Correa asegura que EEUU quiere evitar su triunfo en Ecuador." 15 Oct 2006. Online. Accessed 7 May 2008 [5] TeleSur. "Rafael Correa asegura que EEUU quiere evitar su triunfo en Ecuador." 15 Oct 2006. Online. Accessed 7 May 2008 [6]Hurtado, Oswaldo. Personal Interview. Quito 6 Feb. 2008

Ecuadorian Foreign Policy: Traditions

What are the relevant historic issues in Ecuador's foreign policy?

Ecuador's diplomatic history has focused strategically on the preservation of sovereign territory and resources; politically on the amplification of its national prestige and influence through multilateral institutions and economically on the promotion of national trade through close relationships with the United States, the Andean Community, and to a lesser extent with the rest of Latin America.

Strategic History

Since the formation of the Republic in 1830, Ecuador and Peru have fought over a large portion of the Amazon rainforest. This conflict broke out into open warfare at least five times, once in 1829, 1859, 1941, 1981, and 1995 for an average of once every 41 years. Ecuador lost approximately 200,000 km² in 1942 under the unpopular (in Ecuador) Rio Protocol. Conflict broke out most recently in 1995 during the so called Cenepa War, lasting for a little longer than a month. The conflict reaffirmed the status quo of Peru's sovereignty over the territory and was codified in a 1998 agreement arbitrated by Argentina, Brasil, Chile, and the United States that included a few symbolic concessions for Ecuador, including the permanent leasing of one square kilometer of territory around Tiwintza in the Peruvian Amazon.[1]

Outside of it territorial conflicts with Peru, Ecuador has a history of problems along its northern border with Colombia where the guerrilla war between the Colombian state and the FARC has sporadically spilled over into Ecuador territory. At these times, Colombia and the FARC have both violated Ecuadorian territory. Guerillas have crossed Ecuador's borders seeking safe sanctuary from Colombian troops periodically leading to cross border attacks by that country's military as well as Colombian fumigation of coca crops that it claims the FARC uses to help fund its operations. [2]

Finally, Ecuador maintains sovereignty over a 200 nautical mile zone offshore of its continental and island territories. The claim predates the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea establishing at most a 12 mile limit on offshore claims. The dispute remains unresolved and has periodically caused tensions between Ecuador and the international community. Under various Velasco administrations between 1955 and the early 1970s, Ecuador seized fishing ships that violated this 200 nautical mile limit and fined them. The seizure of two US tuna ships in 1955 resulted in what is known as the 'Tuna Wars' between Ecuador and the US.[3] The United States protested the seizures and has protested Ecuador's maritime claims in 1967, 1986 and 1992 and conducted operational assertions in 1979, 1980, 1985-87, 1989-1994, 1999 and 2000.[4]

Political History

Ecuador's political history has had a major effect on its diplomatic efforts. Recurring cycles of internal instability and short governmental administrations have made the execution of any long term policy very difficult. According to some sources Ecuador has had 95 different governments in its 178 years of independence, meaning that each administration lasted on average 1.8 years.[5]

In the absence of a strong executive with clear policies, the Foreign Ministry has maintained a limited policy agenda that focused on certain key areas favoring the interests of Ecuadorians. These include the principle of non-intervention and national sovereignty, insistence on the rule of law and the rejection of the threat of force in international affairs. These principles manifest themselves in Ecuador's active participation in multilateral institutions, especially within Latin America and a willingness to enter into strategic alliances with stronger powers, like the US.[6]

While these methods are the major vehicles for the execution of Ecuador's policy agenda, the historical variety of executives has influenced the extent to which they were followed. This has been most obvious during administration when the executive was willing to use violence as a political tool or to allow foreign interests to intervene in its internal affairs.

This willingness to resort to violence was seen in the border dispute with Peru where violent conflict broke out as recently as 1995. The rejection of the 1942 internationally mediated treaty also showed a lack of respect for the rule of law, another principle of foreign policy. It declared war on Japan during the Second World War and has seized foreign ships as a means of imposing its 200 nautical mile claim in the Ecuadorian Pacific.[7] Most recently the president authorized the deployment of troops along the Colombian border after Colombian troops attacked a FARC base camp in Ecuadorian territory.

In terms of Ecuador's willingness to allow foreign intervention in internal affairs, the most obvious examples stem from its love/hate relationship with the United States. In 1908 Eloy Alfaro (1842-1912) was accused of "delivering the republic to the Yankees" after signing a contract with a US company to complete the Quito-Guayaquil railroad begun by president Garcia Moreno's (1821-1875).[8] Although this project continued, Alfaro was forced to end negotiations with the US after nationalistic uprisings over a planned US military base in the Galapagos Islands.

In the 1920s a group of advisors from Princeton University helped reorganize the fiscal and monetary structures of Ecuador's economy. In 1942s Ecuador declared war against Japan and granted the US permission to build military bases in the Galapagos islands and the coastal city of Salinas in exchange for military equipment and the withdrawal of support from the US based South American Development Company, a mining company in a wage dispute with the Ecuadorian government.[9]

The post World War II era brought two influential economic booms that furthered Ecuador's dependence on the US, the banana boom of 1948-1959 and the current oil boom that began in the 1970s. The US was the largest importer of Ecuadorian products during this period leaving Ecuador vulnerable to the often overt intervention of the US.

Economic History

Ecuador economy has always relied on the export of primary products. From the colonial period until the 21st century Ecuador, foreign trade has had a preponderant affect on the internal policies of the country. Not surprisingly, if you look at the rise and fall of the average annual price of Ecuador's principal export on the international market during the twentieth century (first cacao, then bananas, and most recently oil) and compare that to the years in which there were coup d'états, there seems to be a direct correlation between political stability and the boom/bust cycle.[10]

Cacao was the country's main export until the 1920s. This boom period corresponded to one of the longest democratic periods of governance in Ecuador's history, with four democratic transfers of power between 1912 and 1925. The sharp drop in the international price of cacao in the 1920s left Ecuador without a stable income source and precipitated a military coup in 1925.

The country had 14 presidents in the 1930s and oscillated between civilian and military control of the government in the 1940s. Instability continued until the election of President Galo Plaza in 1948 who himself attributed his success to the beginning of the banana boom.[11] This period of democratic governance and political stability lasted until the price of bananas dropped in 1959.

After the drop in banana exports, public discontent became visible immediately. There were a series of labor riots protesting the government's economic policies and by 1960 Velasco Ibarra (1893-1975), a five time president famous for his populism and poor economic policies, was elected president a fourth time by promising a quick fix to the nation's problems.[12] His inability to fulfill these promises led to a quick military coup in 1961, thus setting off another period of political instability. There would be seven more coup d'états by 1976.

A military government ruled between 1972 and 1979. During this time they managed to consolidate their power over national politics through control of petroleum exports and transform Ecuador from a banana republic to a major petroleum exporting banana republic.

Even though Ecuador exported enough oil to become a member of OPEC in 1973, the military was unable to capitalize on the increased revenue to improve conditions at home. By 1976 it suffered an internal coup and was replaced by a new military junta whose main priority was holding new elections to transfer power to civilian rule.[13]

Energy prices began to fall in 1980 and dropped sharply in 1986. This, along with a series of natural disasters including flooding from the El Niño climatic effect, an earthquake, and blight that hit shrimp farms and another that affected rose production caused poor economic performance and frequent disputes between the Executive and the National Congress.

Interestingly, while there were no successful coup d'etats in the 1980s, power oscillated in a constant 'back and forth' between presidents from the coast and the sierra in a continuation of the historic rivalries that exist between the 'liberal' coast with Guayaquil at its center and the more 'conservative' capital of Quito in the sierra. This situation continued throughout the 1980s and 1990s but has favored coastal candidates in the 21st century.

Below is a table that graphs the 2007 inflation adjusted average annual price of crude oil in the US with instances of coup d'etats in Ecuador between 1960 and 2008. [14]

As shown by the green line, the period between the 1959 banana bust and beginning of the oil boom in the early 1970s is marked by continuous political unrest with a total of six coup d'états during this time period.

By the time Ecuador became a member of OPEC in 1973 the rising price of oil gave the government more economic breathing space. The 1976 coup came from an internal dispute over the military's role in politics rather than an expression of popular discontent; however, the poor handling of the economy was the impetus for the internal division.

The transition to civilian rule in 1979 and the following 18 years of democratic transitions correspond to an increase in oil prices. However, the two failed coups of 1987 followed six straight years of falling prices and the drastic drop in the price of oil in 1986.

Oil prices fell again in 1998 to their lowest point in 24 years, followed shortly thereafter by a national banking crisis and the decision to dollarize in 1999. The strain was too great on Ecuadorian society and in 2000 a military coup ousted President Jamil Mahuad followed by another coup to remove the military. The then Vicepresident Gustavo Noboa assumed power and completed Mahuad's term.

By Nathan Gill - Southern Affairs
http://www.southernaffairs.org/

[1] Library of Congress. A Country Study: Ecuador. Library of Congress Call Number F3708 .E383 1991. Online. 2 May 2008 [2] Carrión, Francisco. Personal Interview. Quito 28 Jan. 2008 [3] Library of Congress. [4] US Department of Defense. Ecuador: Summary of Claims DOD 2005. 1-M. 2005. 3 May 2008[5] Library of Congress. [6] Ecuadorian Ministry of Foreign Relations. National Foreign Policy Plan 2006-2020. Quito Oct. 2006 [7] Library of Congress. [8]Library of Congress. [9] Library of Congress. [10] Library of Congress. [11] Library of Congress. [12] In recognition of his great charisma Velasco once famously said, "Give me a balcony and I will become president." Reid, Michael. Forgotten Continent: The Battle for Latin America's Soul. Yale Univ Press. London 2007: 79 [13] Library of Congress. [14] Data compiled from InflationData.com. Historical Crude Oil Prices (Table). and Da Graca, John V. Heads of State and Government. 2nd ed. MacMillan Press. 2000

Ecuadorian Foreign Policy: Actors and Institutions

Who are the relevant actors in the creation of Ecuador's national foreign policy and what structures do they operate within?

As mentioned, the current foreign policy organization is based on the institutional structure established in the 1998 Constitution. According to Article 2, "The Head of State, as Supreme Representative of the country and its sovereign rights abroad, is in charge of conducting international affairs and the Foreign Service.

According to article two of the Ecuadorian National Constitution of 1998, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, in his capacity as immediate assistant to the Head of State, is in charge of collaborating directly with the President in the formulation and execution of international policy." The Ecuadorian Foreign Ministry is divided between two Vice Ministries, the Viceministro de Relaciones Exteriores and the Vice Ministro de Comercio Exterior e Integración.

These two branches report to the Minister who is advised by a Junta Consultiva in the execution of foreign policy established by the President of the Republic. The president is also the commander in chief of the armed forces. He is advised on national security issues by the Minister of Defense, the National Security Council and the Joint Command as well as the commanders of the three branches of the military.

The current President is Rafael Correa (b.1963), an economist and former university professor from Guayaquil, who served in the previous presidential administration of Alfredo Palacio as the Minister of Finance for a short time in 2005. Correa has been critical of the neoliberal economic model as well as the traditional influence exercised by the United States. He is a sporadic supporter of 21^st Century Socialism and the Venezuelan Bolivarian Revolution, but has not embraced its more radical proposals like becoming a member of the ALBA, the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas, and its defense group

The current Foreign Minister is María Isabel Salvador Crespo, the former Minister of Tourism, former assistant director of the World Council of Churches and a member of various European commercial councils. She is also the daughter of a former Minister of Foreign Relations.

The President of the Foreign Affairs committee of the Constitutional Assembly, Mesa 9 Soberanía, Relaciones Internacionales y Integración Latino Americana - is Maria Augusta Calle, the head of Venezuela's State run Telesur TV network in Ecuador and the founder of ALTERCOM, an 'anti-imperialist' alternative communication source allegedly used to diffuse FARC propaganda in mainstream media. According to the Miami Herald, documents obtained from the personal laptop of the dead FARC rebel commander Raúl Reyes, killed on 1 March 2008, show that Calle is a member of the FARC propaganda movement.

The Vice President of the commission is Gabriela Quezada, a 24 year old high school graduate who has lived in Valparaiso, Chile for the last 14 years.

By Nathan Gill - Southern Affairs

http://www.southernaffairs.org/

South American Regional Integration Institutions: Unasur, ALADI, CAN and Mercosur

There are four regional integration institutions in South America; CAN, MERCOSUR, ALADI, and UNASUR. The first two are subregional blocks representing nine of the 12 South American member countries of Unasur; neither is fully functional. [1]

All the nations of South America, except for Guyana and Surinam, are members of ALADI. Its goals are similar to the Unasur. The only two non-South American members are Mexico and Cuba. [2] Since its inception in 1981, ALADI has achieved very few of its goals and has been eclipsed most recently by the formation of Unasur. This final institution is a specifically South American initiative designed to unite these various processes into one single institution.

Unasur Institutional Structure

Previously known as the Comunidad Sudamericana de Naciones (CSN), it was founded in 2004 by the Declaración del Cusco. It is a 12 nation cooperation treaty designed to propel regional integration efforts forward into the twenty-first century by coordinating dispersed efforts under one central integration authority with its headquarters in Quito, Ecuador.

UNASUR is composed of the nations of MERCOSUR (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay), the Andean Community (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru), Chile, Guyana, Suriname and Venezuela. The union has a combined population of approximately 377 million, an internal market (PIB) of US$1.5 trillion, and a total area of 17 million sq/km, including 27 percent of the Earth's fresh water, 70 percent of its known copper reserves, enough oil and natural gas to last the continent a century, the Amazon rain forest, the fertile pampas, the Andes mountains, and maritime access to the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and the Caribbean Sea. [3]

For a region like South America, plagued with internal conflict, weak national political institutions, and the world's worst income disparity, these goals seemed ambitious.

The institutional structure was agreed upon during the 2005 Summit of Brasilia where the Presidents of South America decided that the meeting of heads of state would be the highest level of political contact within UNASUR. These are supposed to occur annually and the location rotates around the region. [4] This structure was formally ratified in the 2008 Summit of Brasilia.

Meetings of heads of state are the highest level of political contact. The president of country hosting the annual summit is the acting president of the union for one year and the presidents of the previous and following years advise the current president to permit better transitions.

Foreign Ministers make the executive decisions; they are scheduled to meet twice a year to discuss issues of mutual interest and are in charge of preparing the regional agenda for the annual meeting of heads of States. Vicecancillers are in charge of coordinating the respective positions of member countries before the meetings of foreign ministers. Below this level are ad hoc ministerial meetings of specific social sectors such as salud, educación, cultura, ciencia y tecnología, seguridad ciudadana, infraestructura de energia, transportes, comunicaciones, y desarrollo sostenible. [5]

UNASUR was first created without a formal institutional bureaucracy in order to avoid adding additional layers of administration on top of those already existing in CAN, Mercosur, and ALADI. However, it became apparent by 2007 that an organization dispersed over a continent without any sort of central administration was not practical. To correct this, an office of Executive Secretary was created with headquarters in Quito, Ecuador and a regional parliament will be located in Cochabamba, Bolivia.

The position of Secretaria General was offered to Rodrigo Borja, a former president of Ecuador, in 2007. Borja accepted and began drafting a constitutive charter for the union that would have combined the subregional blocks of CAN and Mercosur into Unasur.

His proposal also called for a strong executive branch which would be in charge of setting the regional agenda and ensuring compliance. In Feb 2008, Borja made clear in a private interview with the author that he would not be part of just another layer of ineffective state bureaucracy. Although his draft was submitted to the presidents of each country in 2007 he had not received a response at the time we spoke with him. [6]

One day before the May 2008 Summit of Brasilia, he publically rejected the offer to serve as Executive Secretary because the presidents rejected his proposal to create an agile institution capable of achieving the ambitious goals of integration. Instead, it was decided to create a forum of 12 representatives from each member nation as well as the Executive Secretary while reserving maximum authority for the presidents of each country. [7]

Also involved in the direction of Unasur are the Presidente del Comité de Representantes Permanentes del MERCOSUR, the Director de la Secretaría del MERCOSUR, del Secretario General de la Comunidad Andina, the Secretario General of de la ALADI, and the Secretaría Permanente de la Organización del Tratado de Cooperación Amazónica to provide the necessary staff to carry out the mandates approved by presidents and foreign ministers.[8]

By Nathan Gill - Southern Affairs
www.southernaffairs.org

[1] Alfaro Espinosa, Silvia. Personal Interview. Lima 27 Feb. 2008. [2] The exclusion of Mexico from Unasur will be analyzed further on. [3] Velasco, Gema. "La Comunidad Sudamericana, ¿ilusión o realidad?" Americaeconomica.com - 10 Dec 2004. [4] The 2007 Unasur Presidential Summit scheduled to be held in Colombia was postponed until Mar 2008. It was then postponed and relocated to Brasilia after the diplomatic crisis brought about by the Colombia Ecuador FARC dispute. [5] Declaración del Cusco, Articles 7-11, 8 Dec 2004 [6] Borja, Rodrigo. Personal Interview. Quito 8 Feb 2008. [7] El Universal Caracas. "Renuncia de Rodrigo Borja empaña inauguración de UNASUR" 22 May 2008. [8] Declaración del Cusco, Article 3, 8 Dec 2004