Historiography: Brazilian Hegemony in South America

(Mar. 31, 2008) The last explanation we will analyze here is what we are referring to as the "Brazilian hegemonic" explanation. This position holds that Brazil, given the much larger size of its population, economy, and territory relative to the rest of the region, is the natural hegemon in South American regional affairs.[1] This position also maintains that UNASUR is a Brazilian initiative to more effectively allow it to promote its interests abroad. [2] [3] [4] The first part of this claim rests on the undisputed size of all things Brazilian while the second highlights the protagonistic role of Brazilian foreign policy in the late 1990s and into the present century.

From a socio-economic point of view, Brazil represents about half of South America. To list some of its superlatives, the country itself is slightly smaller than the U.S., occupying roughly 50 percent of the continent; it is the home of more than half of the population and produces slightly less than half the total gross domestic product (GDP) of South America. [5] Internationally Brazil is also a global power. It is one of the ten largest economies in the world, and has served on the UN Security council as a non permanent member more than any other country except Japan. [6] These figures help give an idea of the international importance of Brazil as a nation, as well as the basis for those explanations that highlight the leading role of Brazil in the international system within South America.

Supporters of the explanation of Brazil's hegemonic role in the formation of UNASUR highlight the influential role played by Brazil during the late 1990s leading up to the Summit of Brasilia, convoked by then President Cardoso in 2000, and the first Summit of Heads of State of the South American Community of Nations (CSN), again hosted in Brasilia in 2005. These two meetings helped lay the foundations for the current process of integration. Brazil's official foreign policy recognizes the strategic advantage the leadership role in South America gives Brazil by saying that "Brazil's position as a global actor is fully consistent with the emphasis that we put on regional integration, and vice versa. In fact, our capacity to peacefully coexist with our neighbors, while contributing to the development of the region is a significant factor that underlies our international role." [7] And in an Economist article in 2004 Celso Amorim, the current foreign minister said, "in a world likely to be dominated by blocks, Brazil's best option is to co-operate as much as possible with its neighbors…" [8] This opinion runs counter to conventional wisdom that holds that large nations have more to lose by entering regional unions with smaller countries. [9] In the case of Brazil this is due to a strong history of diplomatic multilateralism that will be discussed further in the section on Brazilian foreign policy goals.

By Nathan Gill - Southern Affairs www.southernaffairs.org

[1] Ribando 2007:9. [2] Carrión, Francisco. Personal Interview. Quito, Ecuador 28 Jan. 2008. [3] Ortiz, Benjamín. Personal interview. Quito, Ecuador. 5 Feb. 2008. [4] Ribadeneira, Diego. Personal interview. Lima, Perú. 29 Feb. 2008. [5] IMF World Economic Outlook Database 2006. CEPAL 2006. [6] Amorim 2007 [7] Ibid [8] "A Giant Stirs." The Economist. 10 Jun. 2004. 28 Mar. 2008 [9] "Geopolitical Diary: The Obstacles to Latin America's UNASUR" Strategic Forecasting. 24 Apr. 2007. n. pag. Online. 28 Mar. 2008

Historiography: Historical-Cultural Explanations

(Mar. 30, 2008) Other explanations for why the region has decided to pursue a strategy of South American unification focus on the cultural similarities between these nations. This interpretation emphasizes the post colonial Pan-American unification movement, begun by the early Liberators like Bolívar, Sucre, San Martin, or O'Higgins who said, “la patria de los americanos debía ser el continente entero.” [1] It also highlights the similarities of languages (Portugese and Castillian), a common Christian religion (Catholicism and Protestantism), legal philosophy, shared multiethnic cultures, etc. as examples of this inherent similarity. [2]

The identification of a regional union with the historic Pan-American movement has its most vocal supporters in governmental institutions who describe the current integration process in terms of an ongoing historic process begun two centuries earlier. This connection is made explicit in the preamble to the 2004 Declaration of Cuzco that states:

"We, the Presidents of the South American countries, gathered in the city of Cusco during the celebration of the heroic battles of Junín and Ayacucho and of the convening of the Amphictyonic Congress of Panama, following the example of the Liberator Simón Bolívar, of the Grand Marshal of Ayachuco, Antonio José de Sucre, of the Liberator José de San Martín, and of our pro-independence nations and heroes who built the great American Nation without any borders, interpreting the aspirations and hopes of their people for integration, unity and the construction of a common future, have decided to form the South American Community of Nations."

This expression of what we will call 'South American Manifest Destiny' is also visible in comments made by Eduardo Duhalde, former president of Argentina and Presidente de la Comission de representantes permanents del MERCOSUR, who said "[Unasur] is the dirección adoptada por la historia" or by Peruvian Ambassador Ernesto Pinto Bazurco who wrote that "la integración de América del Sur es un destino historic." [3] [4] Finally, Allan Wagner, former Sec. Gen. Of the Comunidad Andina said "La integración es un proceso histórico. Todos nosotros somos de alguna manera actores circunstanciales de ese proceso." [5]

This theory of historical—cultural similarity is not universally accepted because it rests on the premise that the whole South American continent is so similar that it is seemingly preordained to unite. While it is true that the region does share a number of historical socio—economic problems (mercantilist colonial background; primary export economies; weak political institutions; ethnic tensions; income disparities; etc), the individual societies themselves are very different.

According to Fernando Moreno, "[América Latina] está…diversificada por la existencia de materias históricas específicas de naturaleza heterogénea, constituidas por grupos humanos étnica y culturalmente diferentes y por medios geográficos extremadamente variados según los países. [6]

The assumption of a common historical—cultural history of all of territorial South America as the basis for today's process is problematic because it does little to explain why previous attempts to unite were based on different criteria. The famous Bolivarian Pan—American Congress that met in Panama in 1826 was made up of delegates from the Hispano—American regions excluding the Lusophone and Anglophone countries. Finally, the 1960 Latin America Free Trade Agreement (LAFTA/ALALC) and its offspring the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI) of 1980 were both posited on a Latin American union open to Central America, the Caribbean States and South America. However, there is no reason to assume that UNASUR could not grow to encompass a more "traditional" Latin American membership.

By Nathan Gill - Southern Affairs
www.southernaffairs.org

[1] Barros Van Buren, Mario. Historia Diplomática de Chile (1541-1938). 2nd. ed. 1958. Editorial Andrés Bello: Santiago de Chile 1990: 51 [2] "The shared and unified history of our nations which, from the very heroic deeds in their striving for independence, have confronted common internal and external challenges, shows that our countries have a still untapped potential for making better use of their regional aptitudes and for reinforcing their capacities for international negotiation and projection;…" Declaration of Cusco, Dec. 8, 2004 [3] El Comercio. Interview with Peruvian Ambassador Ernesto Pinto Bazurco. 27 Dec. 2004 [4] Rafael Bielsa, former Argentinean Minister of Foreign Relations also called UNASUR the "unico porvenir común posible." Clarin de Argentina. "Nuestro destino sudamericano." Online 8 Dec. 2004 [5] Rojas R., Ingrid. Interview with Allan Wagner Tizón Nos encontramos en la comunidad sudamericana. El Mundo de Venezuela: Caracas 31 May 2006. [6] Moreno, Fernando. 1978: 106-107

Historiography: Economic Explanations of South American Integration

(Mar. 29, 2008) There are several ways of approaching the question of South American integration; depending on which facet of society you choose to analyze you get a different answer. The most popular explanations are economic, historical/cultural, and Brazilian.

The emphasis on economic explanations is succinctly explained by Vanden and Prevost who note, "In Latin America one cannot fully understand the political game without understanding its economic underpinnings."1 because of the strong influence of the Marxist school of structuralism economic explanations tend to focus on the region's dependent peripheral commercial status.2

Cultural explanations highlight the similarities that exist between the nations of South America, emphasizing the shared history of European colonialism and the similar historical challenges faced by many nations in the region.3

Finally, by "Brazilian" we mean those theories that view the current integration movement as an extension of Brazil's natural sphere of influence inside South America.

ECONOMIC EXPLANATIONS

Structuralist interpretations of South American economics, made famous by the dependency theory of Raúl Prebisch, became influential beginning in the 1940s and gradually gained followers until it became the official policy of the UN Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC/CEPAL).4

This theory described North—South relations in terms of a wealthy center and an impoverished periphery, with the industrialized nations of Europe and the U.S. representing the "North" and the non—industrialized exporting nations of Latin America, Africa, and Asia representing the "South."

Briefly, based on extensive analysis of the relationship between primary goods and manufactured goods' prices, the Prebisch thesis concluded that the North benefitted disproportionately from its trade with the South because of the added value attributed to the manufacturing process, a factor that allowed profits to accumulate in industrialized nations while the South maintained a perpetual trade deficit with the North.5

The central premise to this theory is that the price of manufactured goods tends to increase while the price of primary goods tends to deteriorate over time. Accordingly, this vicious circle of trade deficit and increasing national debt could be broken through a state—controlled process of national industrialization.

The first application of this theory occurred in the late 1940s in Argentina and was referred to as import-substitution-industrialization (ISI). At the time it was thought that the best way to stimulate the industrialization process was through a closed national economic system that ensured a captive market at home by imposing high tariffs on foreign product imports.

The realization that domestic markets were too small to support the budding national industry gave rise to the second wave of practical application, referred to as CEPALian because it was championed by the UN Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC/CEPAL) in the early 1960s. This time it was suggested that planned economies within small regional blocks could provide the necessary conditions for sustained economic growth by amplifying "internal" markets through the inclusion of allied nations, while limiting the overexposure to "external" markets experienced in the past. Specific examples of this in Latin America were the Latin American Free Trade Agreement in 1960 and the Andean Pact in 1967.

The late 20th century was marked by the accumulation of foreign debt and a series of failed attempts to manipulate national markets to stimulate growth to pay off foreign debt. The historiography of this period is relevant to our study because of the way it has come to assign guilt to different actors for the economic problems that occurred.

The accepted history of this period holds that the movements toward national and closed regional industrialization discussed earlier required large amounts of capital. After national financial resources dried up, nations began to borrow heavily from international lending agents.

Vanden and Prevost cite growing populations, an increased demand for "western consumer goods," the oil crisis of 1973—1974, and high rates of military expenditure in countries like Peru, Chile, Argentina, and Brazil as the major reasons behind the accumulation of debt in South America which "combined to radically increase the external debt in Latin America which jumped from less than [US]$30 billion in 1970 to more than [US]$230 billion in 1980."6

This coincided with a global economic downturn in the 1980s, a drop in commodity prices, and a series of natural disasters that cumulatively caused such poor economic performance that the 1980s are commonly referred to as the "Lost Decade."

In keeping with one of the prominent historical narratives concerning this period, a rejection of closed national and regional systems followed the Lost Decade as what came to be known as the Washington Consensus, a group of international financial institutions, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID).

Many of the economists at these institutions were influenced by the neoliberal theories of Milton Friedman. In the words of Vanden and Prevost, they began "to first suggest and then insist on economic structural adjustments to the national economies" arguing that "Latin American nations must take the bitter pill of austerity…."7

In this reading of events, one in which the economic reforms were imposed on South American nations, the author actively assigns blame for the economic chaos of the late 20th century and on the Washington Group, and by virtue of association, the United States.8 Others argue that a lack of accompanying political reform, the endemic corruption present in the region, and insufficient time for the reforms to take effect were the main reasons for the failure of this economic model in South America.9

The first story has been used to political benefit by the Argentinean Presidents Nestor Kirchner and his wife Cristina Fernandez and the 21st century socialists: Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez; Ecuadorean President Rafael Correa; and Bolivian President Evo Morales, who utilize a populist discourse that demonizes US "economic imperialism."10

More moderate critiques of this model hold that neoliberal policies actually made a bad situation worse. To quote Vanden and Prevost again,

"Poverty and misery continue and have increased in some countries. Income and wealth have become even more concentrated in the hands of the wealthy few, although the spread continues to the middle class, Many argue that the social costs of this form of development are too high."[11]

In a somewhat similar tune, the Inter-American Development Bank published a report in 1999 entitled "Facing up to the Inequality in Latin America, Economic and Social Progress in Latin America, 1998—1999 Report" where they obliquely critique the neoliberal policies formerly proposed by their institution.[12] The IMF has also recognized the limits of the neoliberal model in an IEO report on the IMF in Argentina.[13]

What interests us is not whether the Washington Consensus was right or wrong, but how these interpretations assign responsibility for internal national decisions on external international institutions, therefore perpetuating a myth of a South America, dependent on the "North" not only for manufactured goods, but ideas as well; however, these accounts do not problematize the internal process of political and economic development in South America and shed little light on the role of South America as an actor in its own history.

The acceptance of this model of foreign dependency has legitimized the anti-US sentiment prevalent in South America today. This has affected the regional integration movement by crippling the US—led Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) begun in 1989 by then—US President George Bush through the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative and furthered in 1994 by Bill Clinton at the Miami Summit of the Americas.

The collapse of the FTAA negotiations has been blamed on South America's subregional approach to hemispheric integration.[14] However, even without the support of South America, the U.S. was able to move forward on a North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with Canada and Mexico in 1994 and a Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) with limited coverage of the Caribbean in 2003, effectively creating a free trade zone that covers half the hemisphere.[15] South America's decision to abstain from this process of integration has set the stage for UNASUR and the process of negotiation we will study later on.

By Nathan Gill - Southern Affairs
www.southernaffairs.org

[1] Vanden, Harry E. and Gary Prevost. The Power Game. Oxford University Press, England, 2002 p. 146 [2] Ibid p.158 [3] Declaración del Cusco sobre la Comunidad Sudamericana de Naciones III Cumbre Presidencial Sudamericana, 8 de diciembre de 2004 [4] Interview with Francisco Carrion, Former Foreign Minister of Ecuador; Interview with Benjamín Ortiz, Former Foreign Minister of Ecuador; Moreno, Fernando. "La Integracion Latinoamericana" Instituto Chileno de Estudios Humanisticos. Santiago de Chile, 1978 p.30 [5] Frankenhoff, Charles A. The Prebisch Thesis: A Theory of Industrialism for Latin America. Journal of Inter-American Studies, Vol. 4, No. 2 Apr. 1962: 185-206 [6] Vanden and Prevost. (2002) p. 163[7] Vanden and Prevost 2002: 165 [8] For more on the South American critique of the Washington Consensus see: Morales Ayma, Evo. Construyamos con nuestros pueblos una verdadera Comunidad Sudamericana de naciones para "Vivir bien." La Paz, Bolivia, 2 Oct. 2006.; Dieterich, Heinz. ¿ALCA o desarrollismo regional?; and Feldstein, Martin. Argentina's Fall: Lessons from the Latest Financial Crisis. Foreign Affairs, March/April 2002 [9] Ortiz, Benjamín. Personal Interview. Quito: 5 Feb. 2008 [10] President Kirchner and Chávez' opposition to the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) at the IV Summit of the Americas see Council on Hemispheric Affairs. 21 Nov. 2006. [11] Vanden and Prevost 2002: 173 [12] "Inter-American Development Bank. Facing Up to Inequality in Latin America Report on Economic and Social Progress in Latin America, 1998-1999. [13] Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) of the IMF. The Role of the IMF in Argentina, 1991-2002: Issues Paper. July, 2003. 31 Mar. 2008 http://www.imf.org/External/NP/ieo/2003/arg/070403.pdf BBC. "IMF owns up to Argentina errors." London: 25 Mar. 2004. 6 Nov. 2006[14] Vanden and Prevost. 2002. p.172 and for a discussion of Presidents Kirchner and Chávezs' opposition to the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) at the IV Summit of the Americas see Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 21 Nov. 2006[15] The Dominican Republic was integrated in CAFTA in 2004 becoming the U.S.—Dominican Republic—Central American Free Trade Agreement (DR—CAFTA). Costa Rica, the last country to ratify DR-CAFTA, approved the agreement in a national plebiscite in 2007

Regularity of Interaction Among South American Nations

(Mar. 28, 2008) The final factor we will look at in this section is the degree to which South American nations interact with each other.

The formal political institutions that link the entire region are the United Nations and the Organization of American States. If Guyana and Surinam are removed the list increases to include the Organization of Ibero-American States, ALADI, the Rio Group, and the World Trade Organization.

The level of diplomatic interaction is varied between nations and ministries but there at least two high level presidential meetings between South American presidents each year. The number of international reunions increases at the ministerial level, and if the subregional institutions of MERCOSUR and CAN are included, the degree of formal interconnectivity between the states increases even more.

The nations of the region are also interconnected through a series of nonpolitical links including sporting and cultural events, intraregional immigration, cross-border investment, and educational exchanges. The level of interaction between individual countries changes throughout the region but is generally greatest between neighboring countries.

For example, according to the 2002 Chilean Census, there were 149,162 immigrants from the Western Hemisphere living in Chile. Of this group 71 percent come from other Latin American countries, with 95 percent originating from the neighboring countries of Argentina, Peru, and Bolivia.[1]

In Argentina the 2001 census estimated that 60 percent of immigration comes from neighboring countries, with Paraguay leading (325,046), followed by Bolivia (233,464), Chile (212,429), Uruguay (117,564), and Brasil (34,712).[2]

The relations these communities create between their host country and home country are perhaps the most visible face of regional integration and form the basis for many of the subsequent efforts of regional governments to address the interests of these populations (commerce, education, immigration, narcotics, etc).

Finally, the Caribbean states of Guyana, and Surinam and to some level Colombia and Venezuela, have had stronger ties with the rest of the Caribbean basin than with their southern neighbors. Historic relations with the US and Europe, and the south's relative independence from these global influences on top of the vast geographic distances has made the interaction of the Carribbean north and the southern cone more difficult. By understanding these areas of interconnection and divergence we should be better able to understand the challenges facing regional integration.

By Nathan Gill - Southern Affairs
www.southernaffairs.org

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[1] Argentina (50,448) Peru (39,084) Bolivia (11,649)

[2] Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos de la República de Argentina (INDEC), Censo Nacional de Población, Hogares y Viviendas, 2001.

Definitions and Limitations I: Initial Assumptions on UNASUR

(Mar. 26, 2008)The decision to analyze the countries of South America as a regional subsystem of Latin America is based on the membership criteria of UNASUR itself. While it may be debatable that all of the territory southeast of Panama actually forms a single analytical subsystem, given that the region has opted for a union based on this geographic division, it is necessary to analyze the similarities and differences present between these nations.

To do this we will analyze four factors, suggested by G. Pope Atkins, these are: 1) physical borders; 2) regional and extra-regional powers; 3) perceptions of shared identity; 4) regularity of interaction among the nations.[1]

The chronological limits of this study were determined by a detailed analysis of government documents as well as expert interviews that haves led us to conclude that the latest wave in the ongoing process of regional integration began historically with the end of the Cold War but it was not until the 2000 Summit of Brasilia that the leaders of the region enunciated their intentions to seek a subregional South American union based on the geographic limits of the South American continent.[2]

However, it is important to note that placing a definitive date on movements of this sort is always arbitrary at some level. Accordingly, we will work to place the formation of UNASUR in its historical context by discussing its institutional precursors; ALADI, MERCOSUR, and the Andean Community.

Finally, our decision to limit our study of the region to six countries; Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela is due to time limitations imposed by the academic process itself. We selected these countries for the following reasons. Argentina, Brazil, and Chile were chosen because of their historical importance in regional balance of power politics. Venezuela was chosen because of its important role in the current direction of the integration movement, as well as its importance as a regional source of finance and energy. Ecuador was chosen because it is both the headquarters of the new union as well as a country where the author has several personal contacts that were able to provide invaluable assistance in the research of this thesis. Finally, Peru was chosen because of its large, diverse population, and its historic importance in the regional balance of power.

By Nathan Gill - Southern Affairs
www.southernaffairs.org

[1] Atkins, G. Pope. 2001: 46-47[2] Ribadeneira, Diego. Personal interview with Ambassador Ribadeneira. Lima, Perú. 29 Feb. 2008.

Definitions and Limitations II: Physical Borders

Geographically, South America refers to the territory located roughly between 12.5 degrees north and 56 degrees south latitude, and 34.5 east and 81.5 degrees west longitude, corresponding to the nations located southeast of Panama: Colombia, Venezuela, Guyana, Suriname, Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Paraguay, Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay. Physically it is bordered by the Caribbean Sea and the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Internally it is divided by the Andean highlands in the west, the tropical northern lowlands and the Guiana Shield, the Amazon rainforest in the center, and the relatively drier southern cone. The northern Caribbean States of Venezuela, Guyana, Suriname, and parts of Colombia and Brazil are isolated from the rest of the region by a vast series of wetlands and rainforest while the countries of the more populous western portions of Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Chile, and Colombia are isolated on the western Pacific coast by the Andes Mountains, the longest and second highest mountain chain in the world. Finally, the territory located south of the Amazon and east of the Andes encompasses some of the most fertile land on the planet and the majority of Brazil's population and all of Paraguay's, Argentina's, and Uruguay's.

On a smaller scale, most countries in the region are further subdivided by bisecting mountain chains, rainforests, or deserts that act as internal barriers to trade and communication. These geographic divisions are often able to transform themselves into internal barriers to economic and political development. Internal political divisions are more pronounced in the Andes due to the distances between the coast and sierra but are also present in other countries due to the vast distances and relatively poor physical integration between urban centers and rural provinces. Manifestations of the effect of this geo-political division include the formation of rival political factions like that of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the historic political rivalries between Guayaquil and Quito, the Peruvian highlands demands for more autonomy and funding from Lima, the Bolivian lowlands ongoing disputes with the central government in the highlands of La Paz, and the poverty and relative underdevelopment of the north western interior of Brazil. These historical disputes over the locus of power and access to state resources have played a very influential role in the resulting power dynamics in each of these nations and continue to influence the direction of the current integration process.[1]

By Nathan Gill - Southern Affairs
www.southernaffairs.org

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[1] Vanden and Prevost (2002): 3-5

Definitions and Limitations III: Regional and Extra-Regional Powers

The broad geographic zones outlined in the last entry also correspond to the general separation of historic interests in South America.

According to Atkins, the economic and political interests of the Caribbean states of Colombia, Venezuela, Guyana, and Suriname have been predominantly influenced by the hegemonic influence of the United States and their respective European colonial powers, while what he calls the "southern cone" nations beyond the Caribbean basin have maintained themselves relatively independent of the influence of foreign powers.[1] Although outside interference may have been less acute in the southern states than in northern ones, none have been entirely free from it.

During the colonial period the region responded to Spain and Portugal's Euro-centric interests.[2] After independence in the early nineteenth century the British became the most important, but not only, foreign power in the region.[3] The Spanish tried to regain control of some of their former colonies,[4] the French still maintained their colony in French Guiana, but neither was able to compete with the British monopoly in Atlantic maritime traffic. In the nineteenth century Britain played an important role in infrastructure development in Argentina, Brazil and Chile. However, their overall influence in the Americas diminished over time as the British Empire collapsed after the First World War and the U.S. slowly replaced them as the top geo-political power in the hemisphere. By the end of the Second World War the U.S. had effectively converted itself into the undisputed power in the region.[5]

In terms of the historic regional balance of power, the so called ABC states of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile all competed for strategic influence in the nineteenth century. During this time period Argentina tried to expand its control over its former colonial territory in Uruguay, Paraguay, and parts of Bolivia, while containing the influence of Peru while it tried to dominate the Rio Platte Basin.

Brazil began a successful period of territorial expansion into eight neighboring countries that lasted between 1851 and 1900, and Chile sought to establish naval control over the south Pacific. These policies led to the formation of a series of strategic alliances between Chile, Colombia and Ecuador against the threat of Peruvian aggression and another one between Brazil, Chile and Paraguay against Argentina.[6]

In 1902 Chile and Argentina signed the Pacto de Mayo formally recognizing each country's regional spheres of influence in the South Atlantic and Pacific. According to Atkins this loose balance of power in the southern cone effectively came to an end by 1920 as the much larger populations of Brazil and Argentina outstripped those of Chile. The former two countries then continued to compete for regional dominance until the end of World War II, when U.S. military aid to Brazil upset the historic balance of power between them. However, the historic competition for regional influence between these two countries continues to influence modern day relations and is a significant factor in the processes of integration that will be explored later on.

By Nathan Gill - Southern Affairs
www.southernaffairs.org

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[1] Atkins 2001: 54

[2] For a more thorough discussion of the Iberoamerican colonies see: Vanden and Prevost 2002; Bulmer-Thomas, Coatsworth, and Cortés Condes 2006; and Moreno 1978.

[3] Moreno, Fernando. "La Integracion Latinoamericana" Instituto Chileno de Estudios Humanisticos: Santiago de Chile. 1978.

[4] Barros Van Buren 1990: 54

[5] Atkins 2001: 58-61

[6] Atkins 2001: 62-63

Definitions and Limitations IV: Perceptions of Shared Identity in South America

The interplay of different cultures in South America is another important factor in analyzing regional politics. The interaction between European immigrants, Africans, and later on immigrants from all over the world with the indigenous communities already living there has created a unique social atmosphere of syncretism and conflict.

A crude division can be made along cultural lines between the indigenous, European (Spanish, Portuguese, and others), and African ethnic groups. These groups can then be further subdivided into numerous others that will not be studied here. There are four official languages spoken; Portuguese, Spanish, English, and Dutch with a number of other minority languages spoken throughout the region. Ironically it is South America's shared history of European colonization that gives rise to some of the strongest divisions observable in the region.[1]

The strict social hierarchy that elevated European culture over the indigenous during the colonial period has had a lasting impact on society by generating vast differences in the quality of life enjoyed by different ethnic groups.[2] The Andes are an especially clear example of this social divide. Here, indigenous communities like the Quechua, Quichua, and Aymara peoples of the sierra still constitute the largest ethnic minority, yet suffer disproportionate poverty rates when compared to their European compatriots.[3]

These differences in shared identity have led to the formation of separate indigenous political parties in Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia to defend indigenous rights. Today, their ability to organize around charismatic candidates during national elections gives them political weight other minorities cannot marshal, making their support critical for politicians trying to win election in these countries.

The southernmost nations of Paraguay, Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay have a different cultural distribution. Because of a relatively smaller indigenous population before colonization began and subsequent military campaigns against remaining populations, there are fewer people of indigenous descent than European descent, and consequently lower levels of intercultural conflict.[4]

In political terms the region shares a common European philosophic and economic tradition. All of the States are mixed constitutional democracies; Guyana is part of the British Commonwealth, Brazil, Argentina, and Venezuela are federal republics, while the remaining states are centralized republics.

Part of South America's shared political tradition stems from its long history of attempts to integrate. Pan-American ideology flourished briefly as a viable theory in the first half of the nineteenth century but was quickly cast aside as unrealistic. The idea and effort were unfortunately timed, but were as pragmatic as they were idealistic. Having endured the same trials of fire from Carabobo to Chacabuco, the new states were aware of their relative insecurity with respect to Europe. Recognizing that cooperation afforded the best chance of protection against the ever-present threat of recolonization, South America tried forming into regional blocks.

Authors like Mario Barros Van Buren and Ramón Sotomayor Valdés contend that the internal political anarchy of the post-independence period brought an end to the hopes of creating a South American union.[5] According to these authors the rise of the nation state and the difficult process of building a national identity generally came at the expense of these Pan-American attempts to establish a regional identity.

What is interesting to note is the malleable nature of identity and the overt efforts by national politicians to manipulate it. We will return to the issue of identity and its role in the current process of integration further on in our investigation.

By Nathan Gill - Southern Affairs
www.southernaffairs.org

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[1] Moreno, 1978, pp.63-64

[2] Vanden and Prevost. (2002) pp. 7-9

[3] CEPAL, Anuario Estadístico, 2006

[4] Vacs, Aldo. (2002) pp. 400, 438-439. It is relevant to point out that although Chile has a relatively smaller indigenous population than its northern neighbors, there are large sectors of the Mapuche communities that still object forcefully to the rule of the Chilean central government.

[5] See Barros Van Buren, Mario. Historia diplomática de Chile (1541-1938) segunda edición (actualizada a 1958). Editorial Andrés Bello. Santiago de Chile: 1990 and Sotomayor Valdés, Ramón. Historia de Chile bajo el gobierno del general don Joaquín Prieto. Santiago, 1962, 4 vols.

Problematizing Regional Integration in South America: UNASUR in the 21st Century

(Mar. 26, 2008) In South American integration literature there is a puzzling divide between primary government sources and secondary analysis. On the one hand you have a series of regional declarations signed by the 12 presidents of South American nations stating their intent to form a new continental block. On the other hand you have a public that remains largely unconvinced and skeptical of the union's long-term chances of success. The fundamental question seems to boil down to whether or not the nations of South America can overcome their traditional conflicts to achieve the goals of the new union.

Critics cite the numerous historical conflicts that still exist between South American nations like the inability to agree on national borders in Chile-Peru, Chile-Bolivia, Chile-Argentina, Colombia-Venezuela, Venezuela-Guyana. Others greeted the news with enthusiasm and pointed to the numerous areas of shared interests that the region could capitalize on in terms of integrated infrastructure, energy, and increased social connectivity. The debate seems to boil down to whether increased global competition would force the region to solve its historic conflicts and capitalize on its shared potential. While a review of the government generated literature is overwhelmingly positive, a similar review of non-governmental literature is at best neutral. Why is there such a difference between the two observed positions?

In order to answer this question it is necessary to identify these historic issues and to determine what would it require to overcome them? We need to know what challenges the region faces internally and externally, what its historic conflicts and distribution of power are, and how individual national interests fit into the region's overall integration plans.

It is also useful to ask whether the current integration process stems from a broad regional acceptance of shared purpose or if it is being pushed by charismatic leaders with ulterior motives? This question is especially relevant in a region known for its weak political institutions.

When someone refers to the policy of "X" country, they usually do not mean specific individuals, but that essence which gives the country its continuity; its institutions. On a political level this usually refers to a set of ministries or departments and the symbolic positions occupied within each ministry. There are others of course, economic, cultural, religious, etc., but in Latin America, these weak institutions, responsible for determining national foreign policy, make analysis difficult. For this reason, we hope our historic approach and use of multiple sources will provide the relevant context necessary to make these approximations. The objective of this thesis is to provide answers to these important questions and propose new ones relevant to the integration process where necessary.

It is our hypothesis that regional integration in South America is, at its most basic level, a reaction to the demands of the changing world order. It is a process remarkably similar to that proposed by early social contract theories, like Thomas Hobbes’, that contend that the organization of men into larger groups is a rational response to outside threats.

The decision to form these groups occurs when societies realize that they are stronger working together than separately. The outside threat in the case of South America is the perceived loss of ground to the rest of the world, notably the rising Asian economic powers, the North American Free Trade Area, and the European Union.

While the majority of the current literature on South American regional integration is skeptical of the success of this process, we believe that in one form or another, the demands of globalization, epitomized by the New World Economic Order (NWO) articulated by the first U.S. President George Bush will force South American politicians to seek strategic alliances with neighboring countries in order to find solutions to domestic problems whose roots lie in the global world.

METHODOLOGY

This will be a descriptive work based on analytic and synthetic research methods divided into four conceptual parts: one, the identification of the relevant theories of international relations and the historic structures that exist between the South American nations as actors on the international stage; two, the identification of the national interests of six South American nations Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela; three, the identification of regional interests as detailed in South American meetings of heads of State between 2000 and 2007 and other primary source documents released by government sources; four, a critical analysis of the information presented in mode of a conclusion.

We will start by focusing on the historical structures of international relations within the region itself, answering questions like; what are the relevant historical events, conflicts, and alliances that have shaped inter-American relations today? Next, we will analyze the national foreign policy objectives of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela before comparing these objectives with those of the region.

We will then present the analysis of a series of primary documents concerning the various aspects of the South American integration process in the 21st century supplemented with relevant secondary source texts to place these movements in their historical context. Finally, through the use of expert interviews we hope to ensure that our findings accurately reflect the current state of the affairs as seen by those on the front lines of the movement.

By Nathan Gill - Southern Affairs
www.southernaffairs.org

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Hobbes [1651] 1963: 143-146

Ecuador Threatens More Diplomatic Problems with Colombia

(Mar. 24, 2008) The Colombian government announced Monday that the second man killed and removed during its attack on a FARC base camp in Ecuador territory was in fact Ecuadorian. The announcement seemed likely to trigger further diplomatic protests by Ecuador's government after President Rafael Correa threatened to reopen the case last Saturday if he found out that the attack had claimed the lives of any Ecuadorians.

The new turn of events comes after nearly a month of emergency meetings and special investigations by the Organization of American States that resulted in a joint resolution, signed by both Ecuador and Colombia that both rejected the Colombian incursion and outlined the process for the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between the two. Even though both sides agreed to the resolution, Ecuador has since been unwilling to let the issue drop. Why not?

Last Friday, before news of the killed Ecuadorian made headlines President Correa said, "While the Colombian government's misinformation campaign continues we will not renew diplomatic relations, let the OAS come, let anyone who wants come, we will not renew relations with Colombia."*

This is a surprising attitude from a president who four days earlier signed an internationally brokered "peace deal" with one of his country's closest economic allies. Why is Correa so belligerent towards Colombia?

One reason is that while diplomatic relations with Colombia have been severed, commercial relations are still open. This means that Correa can continue to play the aggrieved victim without hurting his nation's economy and most importantly, continue to import Colombian fuel, without which Ecuador would face widespread energy shortages.

Given that conflict is a useful political tool, a shrewd politician can increase his popularity by calling on his citizens to unite in the face of a common "enemy." This strategy has been used successfully in the past by Venezuelan President Chavez and was an effective tool in the 2004 U.S. presidential elections. Because the constitutional reform process in Ecuador is not going according to plan and the national economy is showing signs of overheating due to the rapid increase in government spending in the last year, now is as good a time as any to distract Ecuadorians from their problems at home.

Accordingly, expect Correa to continue to escalate the "crisis" over the next two months as the Constitutional Assembly finishes the final text of the new national constitution. Also, given the significant financial difficulties facing Ecuador, we could also see a proposal to raise taxes against Colombian interests inside Ecuador, but this isn’t likely to go very far given the strong commercial lobbies on both sides of the border. Whatever the specific actions taken by Correa, he will certainly use this opportunity to raise Ecuador's (and his own) international profile.

By Nathan Gill - Southern Affairs

*“Mientras siga esa campaña de desinformación del Gobierno colombiano nosotros no reanudaremos relaciones diplomáticas, venga la OEA, venga quien le dé la gana, no reanudaremos relaciones con Colombia.”

Unasur Founding Summit Cancelled Over Minor Regional Conflict

Mar. 21, 2008) The March 28^th meeting of South American heads of state has been cancelled because of ongoing disputes between Ecuador and Colombia. Leaders had planned to sign a foundational constitution establishing the institutional procedures for UNASUR, a new union composed of the 12 nations of South America.

The cancellation was not a surprise after Colombia bombed an Ecuadorian base camp of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) earlier this month, but is a disappointment nevertheless. The attack caused Ecuador, Venezuela, and Nicaragua to sever ties with Colombia and call for an emergency meeting of the Organization of American States (OAS) to negotiate a settlement to the conflict.

The cancellation seems to prove critics right who say that the region is not yet ready for this kind of a union. Regional diplomats have been working for decades to try to create a South American Free trade agreement but it wasn’t until 2004 when South American presidents signed the founding act of the South American Community of Nations, the direct precursor to UNASUR, with the goal of creating a total political, economic, and social union by 2019. At the time critics said that there were too many ongoing conflicts in the region to allow for the kind of cooperation detailed in the proposal.

Ironically, it is Venezuela's President Hugo Chavez who has spear—headed the more "idealistic," (i.e. social unity) aspects of the current phase of integration. His claim and that made by other self—proclaimed 21^st century socialists, is that the region is capable of overcoming these historical conflicts to create a united front against what he sees as a hostile imperial world. They argue that through solidarity and increased cooperation a region plagued by internal conflicts could work together to tackle shared problems like poverty, underdevelopment, and corruption. However, Chavez has arguably been the main obstacle to the achievement of these goals by interfering in the internal affairs of regional governments, often sacrificing his own country's national interests for personal political gain.

His constant abuse of Colombia's President Uribe, a member of the union, and the United States, one of the region's largest trade partners, has made all but the most banal agreements impossible and alienated important partners like Brazil, Peru, Colombia, and Chile resulting in the almost complete stagnation of the integration process.

This latest conflict is a sad reminder of how far some nations in the region have to go before they can be taken seriously by the rest of the world. Until populist leaders like Chavez put their nation's interests before their own egos, the real work of improving the lot of South American citizens will go undone.

By Nathan Gill - Southern Affairs

Counting the Chips: Political Solution Reached Between Ecuador and Colombia

(March 10, 2008) The crisis that erupted last week over Colombia's bombing of a FARC base camp inside Ecuador seems to have come to an end. A political solution was reached between the region's foreign ministers at the OAS special session while a more personal agreement was reached between the presidents of several Latin American nations at the Rio Group summit in Santo Domingo.

The whole crisis, from invasion to resolution took one week. During that time Venezuela mobilized 85 percent of its military to the border with Colombia, severed diplomatic and commercial relations, and traded verbal insults with Colombia's president in what is being called a microphone war. Ecuador also mobilized thousands of troops, severed diplomatic relations, and threatened severing commercial relations as well. Both nations have now taken steps to normalize relations with Colombia.

From Ecuador's national perspective, it achieved what it wanted. Colombia made a formal apology, it set a strong precedent against future cross—border attacks, and achieved a political victory by putting the long-ignored issue of Colombian territorial infringement in the global spotlight. What it was unable to achieve in the last eight years of formal diplomatic complaints it achieved in one week of special meetings around the region. Yet this victory came at a price.

When news of the attack came out Ecuador's President Correa kept to the diplomatic playbook, cautioned patience until all the facts were available, and seemed on track to treat the incursion as yet another border violation in Colombia's war against the FARC. It was not until Venezuela's president Chavez ordered up 10 battalions of troops on his weekly TV and Radio program that Correa seemed to get offended. From then on he was one step behind Chavez, even though his country was the one that got bombed. That, coupled with Correa's ongoing relationship with Chavez's 21^st Century Socialism, has confirmed Correa's subordinate role to Chavez.

While this is no real surprise, it doesn’t help Correa at home where the Ecuadorian population is anxiously waiting to find out what kind of country Correa's Constitutional Assembly has in store for them. The Ecuadorian assembly, modeled after Venezuela's Constitutional Assembly, has so far been vague about the specifics of the new constitution but has repeatedly sought to reassure Ecuadorians that it is independent of Venezuela influence. Correa's actions undermined their position.

This is no ideal point considering the economic and legal reforms enacted by Venezuela's constitutional assembly have created widespread shortages of basic food products like eggs and milk, a drastic decrease in foreign investment in all market sectors, and a decrease in oil production and exploration, the primary source of Venezuela's national income. For Ecuador, the crisis was a reminder of the close relationship between their president and Venezuela's and the potential dangers of the new constitution.

Another issue highlighted by the crisis was the functional disconnect within the diplomatic process itself. When the OAS council reached an agreement last Wednesday, both Ecuador and Colombia's foreign ministers said they were satisfied with the results. However, President Correa immediately spoke out against the agreement saying that Colombia would have to do much more before he was content to put an end to the conflict. After three more days of escalating tensions the two Presidents finally hugged and made up.

This illustrates the highly personal nature of regional diplomacy and emphasizes the relative weakness of lower level bureaucrats as well as high level ministers in national decision making, even when they are specifically delegated to make them like Ecuador's Foreign Minister was at the OAS. This phenomenon helps explain why the Union of South American Nations (Unasur) has achieved so little up to now. Every change in national political administration requires the negotiating process to begin over so that the new president can place his personal stamp on any agreement reached.

Finally, as a side point, the crisis highlighted how out of touch the United States is with the rest of the region. While the majority of the region, including Colombia viewed the attack as a violation of international law, President Bush reminded the region of how little the principle of national sovereignty matters to the U.S. by unconditionally backing Colombia, even after they admitted they were wrong. Furthermore, after offering unconditional support, Bush then spun the conflict as an example of why Colombia needs a free trade agreement with the U.S., touching on another very sensitive issue in U.S.-Latin American relations at a time when all it really had to do was keep quiet. Had the U.S. stayed neutral in what was obviously a bilateral conflict it would have avoided an unnecessary diplomatic loss and the further alienation of the region.

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By Nathan Gill - Southern Affairs

Colombian Attack Sets Off Unexpected Alarms Around South America

(March 5, 2008) On Sunday Colombia's military bombed a Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) military camp in Ecuadorian territory. The attack killed an estimated 23 rebel combatants, including FARC's second in command, Luis Edgar Devia, a.k.a. Raúl Reyes, reportedly the first secretariat member to be killed in combat during more than 40 years of civil war. The attack also set off a string of repercussions across the hemisphere as regional governments reacted to the apparently undisputed invasion of a foreign nation.

Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez reacted unexpectedly to the attack on Ecuador by mobilizing his military to the border with Colombia and ordering the border sealed to all traffic, severing all diplomatic and commercial relations between the two nations. Ecuador expelled Colombia's ambassador and severed diplomatic ties but has left commercial ones open so far.

Colombia responded to these actions by releasing incriminating evidence they claim was found on computers recovered from the rebel camp alleging that Chavez had given the FARC US$300 million and that Correa's administration had secret negotiations with the revolutionaries..

So what was Colombia thinking? Was President Uribe acting on the presumption that this attack would be viewed in the context of past cross-border strikes that went largely unnoticed, or was it an intentional provocation?

Given the close commercial relationship between the two countries (Ecuador is Colombia's #3 trading partner and vice-versa) and the more or less historically good diplomatic relations between the two, it is unlikely that the attack was meant as a direct provocation. However, Colombia's subsequent allegations against Ecuador and Venezuela, whether accurate or not, raise the proverbial ante in what could have been a minor conflict.

If those claims are true, both accused governments will have a difficult time explain their actions, if not, Colombia has committed a truly clumsy mistake. In either case, the public nature of the accusations have ruined diplomatic relations between the neighbors for the immediate future and will inevitably have negative consequences on regional integration efforts.

By far, the most extraordinary aspect of the crisis so far is President Chavez's reaction. He has gone out of his way to escalate the conflict, seemingly at the expense of his own personal and national interests, reacting disproportionately to what is essentially a conflict between his neighbors.

Several factors could explain his actions: his role in the ongoing hostage negotiations with the FARC; his general desire to exert more political power in the region; his personal dislike of President Uribe; or the rapidly deteriorating socioeconomic situation inside Venezuela itself.

The socio-economic crisis is worth emphasizing because even the more reserved The Economist has suggested that Chavez may go as far as outright hostilities to distract the Venezuelan public from local politics. Chavez's theory that the attack was part of a U.S. backed effort against left-wing governments in the region is the apparent justification for his actions. But given that Quito has recently distanced itself from Caracas and appears to be staking a more moderate line in its regional politics, this line of thought seems misdirected.

If we assume for a moment that Colombia's claims that Chavez has given US$300 million to the FARC is true, it would mean that Chavez has his own plan to destabilize regional relations by supporting regime change in Colombia. In this scenario, the last few months of escalating anti-Colombian rhetoric may be part of a plan to justify a "pre-emptive strike" a la Bush against Uribe's government.

On a regional level, the differing positions taken by member nations at the special session of the OAS were an interesting illustration of interAmerican international relations. While the majority of South American nations are viewing the conflict in terms of national sovereignty, the U.S. has given its unconditional support for Colombia's right to defend itself against terrorism. Both positions are in keeping with the overall strategic interests of the respective nations.

It will be interesting to see what happens to the March 27-28 Unasur Summit of South American Presidents where a detailed institutional charter was scheduled to be signed. If it is not cancelled, the dispute makes it unlikely that the summit will achieve much in terms of new integration efforts, at least until three of its members stop accusing the other of genocide.

By Nathan Gill - Southern Affairs
www.southernaffairs.org